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OxNE- cannot remain for nionths about Westminster Hall and
Lincoln's Inn, and in daily attendance upon the Courts of Common Law and Chancery, without learning many things, of interest
to the American bar, which he would never otherwise learn. But
after having received such kindness and hospitality from the
English bar and the English judges as cannot fail to inspire
feelings of the most profound and grateful ,respect and affection,
one naturally feels great reluctance to speak-of the detail of the
administration of justice here, lest, inadvertently, some possible
breach of the confidence of social life might be -committed or
suspected.
But, speaking only of 'those things which are patent and open
to all, it must be condeded that the ;English courts have many
advantages over us in searching out the head-springs and foundations of the law, which must always give the decisions here greater
weight. On one occasion this was made very obvious in the trial
of a recent suit in equity, on appeal, before the Lord Chancellor
and the Lords Justices, sitting as the full Court of Chancery
Appeal, in the Lord Chancellor's room. A. case was cited which
had not been fully reported. It was the case of The -President
of the United States v. The Executors of Smithson, for the
obtaining of the Smithsonian fund. The inquiry before the court
at the time was, in what name the United States might properly
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sue. It was contended, on the one side, and so held in ViceChancellor WooD's Court, that they could only sue in the name
of some official party or personage, authorized to represent the
interests of the government,, and to answer any cross-bill the
other party might bring; while, on the part of the government',
it was very naturally insisted that they should be allowed to sue
in the name given in the Constitution, and the only name by which
they ever had sued in their own courts. This suit was brought in
that name and dismissed in the Vice-Chancellor's Court, because
no personal party had been joined.. The case alluded to was
brought in for the purpose of showing that they had before sued
in' the English courts of equity in the name of the President of
the United States. It became important, therefore, to show how
far this case, for the recovery of the Smithson legacy, differed
from the ordinary case of the government suing for- the recovery
of its own property. The court ordered the registrar to bring in
the file: when it appeared that, by a special Act of Congress,
the President had been authorized to sue-for and recover this
particular legacy, thus constituting him a special trustee to
receive the same on behalf of the government, and consequently
to discharge the executor upon such receipt of the fund. This
enabled the court to perceive that it had no bearing whatever
upon the general question, and thus virtually confirmed the impression and intimation of the Court .of Appeal, that, as they
expressed it, "The Government of the United States' must be
allowed to sue for their own property in their own name ;" and
this intimation has been since confirmed by the unanimous decision of the full Court of Chancery Appeal. The advantage
of this ready opportunity of consulting the records of equity
cases in the registrar's office, in order to supply any deficiencies
in the reports, is often witnessed in hearings in equity in the
'English courts. And there are many other traditional benefits
resulting naturally from being upon the ground and having at
command all .the appliances of such ready access to records and
documents, which can never be transferred into a distant country.
This, of itself, must always render these localities of great interest to Americans.
And there are sonie other things one meets in the English
courts which' naturally inspire admiration. The judges seem far
more familiar with the leading members of the bar than is
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common in our country. Being in court during the whole time
of the delivery of the almost interminable judgment in the late
case of Slade v. Slade, in the Exchequer, when the law and the
fact both were, by agreement of parties, referred to the court,
which occupied more than four hours in the delivery, we noticed
billets passing between the court and the counsel engaged in the
cause in the most familiar manner, indicating the most perfect
confidence and intimacy. And in all the arguments which we
have listened to in the courts, either of cbmmon law or equity,
there is a constant conversation kept up from the bench, but in
such a common-place and kindly manner, that the counsel against
whom suggestions and intimations are made do not seem at all
embarrassed by them. The wonder seems to be how counsel can
continue such persevering arguments under such multiplied rebuffs
as sometimes fall from the bench here. In one case, where the
argument continued six or seven hours, there was a constant
argument on the part of the bench agaihst the decision of the
court below (it being a hearing on appeal). That was indeed a
very remarkable case, already referred to, where Fice-Chancellor
WooD, upon the supposed authority of a dictum of Sir JOHN
LEACH, solemnly decided that, although a foreign government
might sue in a court of equity in England for the vindication of
its property rights, the United States of America could not
sue in that name, notwithstanding the fact that this was the only
name by which they had ever been known in any public acts with
Her Majesty's Government; but that they must join some personal party for the mere purpose of enabling the opposite party
to obtain a discovery by cross-bill, upon oath. Nothing could
seem more unreasonable upon the face of it, and so it was held
upon appeal. But these constant and repeated intimations from
the bench that it was impossible to maintain the decision below
without a virtual denial of all remedy to the United States, since
the denial of the right to sue in one's own name seemed quite the
same thing as the denial of all remedy; all this, and much more
of the same kind, did not seem in the leact to daunt the courage
of the counsel.
At the conclusion of his judgment in the case of Slade v.
Slade, Baron MARTIN said he wished, on his own personal account
alone, to enter his solemn protest against the practice of submitting matters of fact to the determination of the court instead of
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the jury. He believed nothing was more unsatisfactory than the
trial of matters of fact by the judges. He believed the jury the
only proper tribunal for the det~rmination of matters of fact; and
he must say that he believed -one great reason why the decision
of matters of fact by the jury was so satisfactory was, that they
were not required to assign reasons for their decisions. He
thought it not improbable that if jurymen were required to submit
to the cross-examination of counsel, as to the grounds of their
verdict, they would be quite as much puzzled to find satisfactory
reasons for all their decisions as any .of the witnesses in the
liresent case.
It seemed that, the amount of testimony in this case-of Slade
v. Slade was quite fabulous, and the cost of procuring it almost
monstrous, exceeding $150,000. It is true the determination
of the suit involved an inquiry into the validity of a marriage celebrated in Ldmbardy, an Italian province of the Austrian Empire, at the' time more than forty years since, upon
which depended the title to a baronetcy and large estates. And
this incidentally involved inquiries into' the civil and ecclesiastical law, both of Italy and Austria, to such an extent as to
become, not only very difficult and perplexing, but almost impossible of any satisfactory determination. There was in consequence
a resort to the testimony of legal experts, which was found, as
usual, most unsatisfactory, there being about an equal number on
either side, and each determined to vindicate the Kies of the
party for which he had been called. This had led, in many instances, to a most extended cross-examination, in some instances
extending over nearly twenty days, until in one case certainly,
at the earnest request of the witness, an adjournment 6f the
examination was had, in order to enable him to regain his health,
which had been seriously impaired by the extended cross-examinations. We did not suppose any new light was to be gathered
from the report of these illustrations of the abuse of the duties
of experts or of examiners of witnesses; but it seemed refreshing
to find that in, Westminster Hall, in one of the most venerable
of her ancient -courts, with her skilled and trained counsel, it
was found impracticable to elicit from professional experts any
thing but one-sided opinions. We do not know whether there is
any inherent difficulty in so selecting experts as to render them
fair and impartial; but it appears that in England as well as
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America, when it is allowed to be done by the parties, it is not
easy to obtain any such result. That was the great difficulty in
regard to the case of Slade v. SSlade.
But to return to Baron MARTIN'S protest against submitting
matters of fact to the judges. He said his experience, which was
now somewhat extended, convinced him that almost all the
divided judgments which had been rendered in that court arose
on matters of fact or construction, and not upon matters of pure
law, in regard to which the judges almost never differed. We
could not but feel gratified to find so experienced and able a
member of the English bench confirming our own opinion, which
we had long entertained, but which we believe is not universal
with the American bar. There seems to be a growing opinion
with the American bar that the jury are not to be relied upon as
either fair or competent in the trial of matters of fact. We
believe that complaint, or the cause of it, lies far more at the
door of the judges than is cQmmonly supposed. If the judge is
indifferent, and suffers the cause to glide along without much care
how it is decided, or if he is so muddy in his own views or in the
mode of expressing them ihat he cannot make himself understood
by the jury, it is not improbable that the results of jury trials will
become most unsatisfactory. But where the judge feels bound
to master the cause -and the testimony, and really sums up in a
manner to make the jury understand the law and the facts fully,
and also the application of each to the other, the jury will be able
to reach, in the majority'of cases, a satisfactory result. And a
jury does relieve the judge from great responsibility, and one.
which it is difficult for any tribunal to- sustain, where reasons
must be assigned for every judgment.
There is so much testimony which is either factitious or exaggerated, that it is impossible to decide matters of fact wisely and
justly without disregarding much of the formal testimony, in
regard to which there is no very obvious reason for its rejection,
except the vague belief that there must be some mistake about it.
But such a reason will not be likely to commend itself to the
party who loses his cause in consequence of the rejection. Hence
it has been said that courts of equity decide facts by counting
the witnesses on either side, and that the Chancellor has no scales
for weighing evidence. There will be some exceptions to these
general rules, and some judges will possess an intuitive knowledge
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of facts, as well as law, and will find some mode of satisfying the
parties with the results to which their intuition leads them.
There is another thing which one can scarcely fail to admire in
the English courts. There is no appearance of haste"; certainly
"not of hurry. Perhaps it is more apparent in passing from one
cause to another than any where else. In an American court
there seems to be a kind of horror or dread seizing upon the
bench the moment one cause is coming to an end lest something
else should be crowded in before the court can reach the next
cause on the calendar. Some motion or some question seems to
be the constant dread of the court the moment there is a pause
between two causes. It is not so much so during the progress
of the hearing, but tbe moment the final close is attained there is
a rush for the next cause, so as to preclude all interruption. But
nothing of that kind occurs here. This may be partly owing to
some constitutional or habitual difference in the people of the two
countries. For one cannot ride across the island of Great Britain,
in any direction, in an express railway train, and not observe a
very marked difference in two particulars between this and our
own country, in the stops and in the progress. The train starts
on the moment, at the click of the bell marking its time; it runs
with terrific speed to its next stopping-place, and reaches it the
very moment it is due. Every thing then is quiet; time enough for
all changes, and every thing is ready, and very likely one or
more minutes to spa're before the times arrives for departure.
This is most refreshing. So different from the pauses in railway
travelling in our own country sometimes, where there is scarcely
time to get out of the train before it is off, as if life and death
hung upon losing no time at stops. So in court here. One cause
is finished. Time is given to breathe; to ,pack up books and
papers, and to get in place for taking another cause; and then,
after every body gets ready, quietly start off.
We are by no means sure th'at a good deal of this quiet passage
from one cause to another is not attributable to the fact that no
motions can be interposed except upon motion day, and then
mostly at Chambers. The English judges attribute their relief
from perplexing impediments and motions of every grade of perplexity to the fact of sessions at Chambers, where most of these
motions are heard, and where they are attended by solicitors, and
not in general by counsel.
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And this brings us to dwell for a moment upon the different
grades of the English bar, which are maintained with great
punctilio. The serjeants were long regarded as the highest rank
of the profession. And now all the judges are made serjeants
by special writ, before they can be sworn in as judges. But this
is mere form. It is called taking the coif, and is regarded as a
kind of degree or grade in the profession, which must be attained
before they can be made judges. The order of serjeants was
formerly much more numerous than at present, and they still
compose a separate Inn, to which all the judges join themselves
as soon as they become judges, and afterwards are not allowed
to dine in the hall of their former Inn, except on state occasions
(as the Grand Dinner at the close of Trinity Term, which fell this
year upon the 12th of June), when some fifty to one hundred
benchers and invited guests sit down at the high table, at the end
of Middle Temple Hall, and four or five hundred in other parts
of that vast .hall, and partake of a dinner which would do credit
to the first nobleman in England. After the removal of the cloth,
the Master of the Temple, as the rector of the Temple Church is
styled, returns thanks, and the benchers and honorary guests
retire to the Bencher's Room for dessert, where, fruit and wine
being served, the president first proposes the health of the Master
of the Temple, who responds in a brief speech. Some other
customary toasts follow, concluding with the health of the invited
guests, who all respond, of course, in speeches of more or less
brevity, as taste or inclination may suggest. On the present
occasion, the predominant feeling seemed to be a desire for cordial good understanding with the American nation and people_.
Nothing but the entire reciprocation of that sentiment was offered
in return. But the opportunity of reminding them of the fact
that we claimed to be something more, and better, than a mere
aggregation of separate sovereign states, held together by compact or treaty, was too inviting to be wholly disregarded. It
was explained, in some degree, to that learned assembly of judges
and benchers that a constitution which professed to create a paramount national sovereignty, and which in terms gave a national
legislature and a national executive, and a national judiciary,
having the power to enforce its own decrees by its own police and
by the army and navy, and which had authority to define the
limits of national jurisdiction, and to correct the decisions of all
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the state courts bearing upon that point, must of necessity be
paramount to all state sovereignty; and that the result of the late
national conflict was only to establish the decrees of the national
courts of last resort, declared -years before by our great expounder
of the National Constitution, JOHN MARSHALL, and. to enforce the
eloquent expositions of our great national orator and senator,
DANIEL

WEBSTER, to which men the grand result might be as

fairly and as truly attributable as to the victories of our armies
in the field ; to all which these gentlemen responded with all
earnestness and sincerity, and blessed the hour of our first and
of our final independence. After having been present in that
grand old hall of the benchers of three or more centuries standing, where the principles of English liberty had been cultivated
and expressed, and having listened to the congratulations of the barristers and judges and the encomiums of the elder brethren towards
the younger members of the same great family of juridical teachers and learners, one could not well believe in any natural rivalries or jealousies between the two people, except in the matter
of each doing the best in its power to maintain and defend the
grand and noble principles of English and American liberty. It
was a grand and inspiring occasion, both to the English and
the few representatives of the American bar.
But to return from this digression. The degree of Queen's
Counsel has now practically superseded that of Serjeaut. The
first rank in the profession here next to the judges is the Attorney and Solicitor-General. Then follow some other officials in
the profession, such as the Queen's Advocate-General in Scotland, &c. Then come the Queen's Serjeants by special writ, not
exceeding two or three; then Queen's Counsel, in the order of
seniority of commission; then ordinary barristers. These latter
act as junior counsel, and the Queen's Counsel as seniors. These
all wear gowns and wigs; Queen's Counsel wearing silk, and the
barristers below stuff, gowns. It is obvious .from what one hears
that the English bar are becoming, more or less, weary of being
dressed up in such artificial costume, and that they would be. glad,
at once, to drop the wig, and many of them the gown also. The
most marked indication in this direction which we noticed was in
regard. to the academic dress worn by the students at Oxford.
We met hundreds there with their gowns in their hands, as
one would carry a coat in a warm day, or any other garment,
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which for any cause had become burdensome ! That did not seem
common anywhere except among the students. The professors
and tutors, the doctors and fellows, all wore the gown with dignified bearing and apparent self-satisfaction. But young men unconsciously catch the sense of the outward sentiment, and are
proverbially sensitive to any feeling of ridicule in others towards
either their conduct or their dress. This was the only possible
explanation of the fact of finding so many, both within and
without the college walls, with their academic gown in their
hands, when the statutes of the university render it the indispensable badge to be worn at all times, in college hours. We
believe, at Cambridge, there is some dispensation in that respect
before dinner, and there you do not see the gown before that hour.
But you see it always at Oxford, either worn or *carried, and, as
it seemed to us, more commonly the latter! It is wonderful how
this sense of the ridiculous will crowd out mere pageantry with
sober and earnest men, when it once gets hold. We could but
notice how willingly the English judges put aside their wigs and
gowns at the state dinner, upon entering the Benchers' Hall,
where alone it was allowable.
But we shall be in danger of becoming tedious. There is no
place for the show of pageantry in dress equal to the Lord Mayor
of London and the aldermen, when they appear on state occasions. Scarlet puts on its brightest hues and its broadest borders.
Possibly in America we are in danger of disregarding forms too
much. We have sometimes feared such a result. But one needs
only to see how much of official duty here consists in mere ceremonial, to feel reconciled to its entire abandonment.
I. F. R.
Lo No,

June 14th 1867.

